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direct violation of the constitutional imperative that
they exercise their power impartially. Important
court judgements and the various Commissions of
Inquiry3 into the affairs of the DSO attest to this. For
example, the Hefer Commission of Inquiry –
established to look into allegations that former
national Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani
Ngcuka was a former apartheid spy – stated in its
final report in relation to allegations made in the
press about Mac Maharaj and his wife that  
In a country such as ours where human
dignity is a basic constitutional value and
every person is presumed to be innocent
until he or she is found guilty, this is wholly
unacceptable. Section 41(6)(a) of the
Prosecuting Act was not enacted for nothing
and as long as someone in the National
Director’s office keeps flouting the
prohibition against the disclosure of
information, one cannot be assured that the
Prosecuting Authority is being used for the
purpose for which it is intended… matters
do not appear to be what they should be in
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Those who lament the imminent dissolution of the Scorpions are blinded to the shortcomings of the unit and
fail to see the role they have played in entrenching patronage. Not only have they fallen short of delivering
justice, they have been given the freedom to act as intelligence gatherers without the responsibility of having
to account to oversight structures. This is a shortcoming of the legislation that created the unit, but has
irreparably tarnished the unit’s reputation. Locating a new investigative unit in the SAPS is the best solution to
overcome these problems and avoid them in the future.
South Africa has spent the past decade in anenvironment of patronage. The politics ofpatronage became a defining characteristic of
both public and private spheres of power. Those
with power, either public or private, unashamedly
distributed their patronage to those that they
believed were either ‘in’ or ‘out’ of favour. 
The alliance of the powerful2 - government, banks
and the corporate elites - excelled in the exercise of
their power. Their actions had the effect of creating
targeted favour or prejudice and in so doing they
either ‘made’ or ‘broke’ those who were the subject
of their patronage or scorn. In this environment, the
abuse of power took root, fostering the use of
democratic means to produce undemocratic
outcomes. 
Tarnished: the NPA and the DSO
The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the
Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) cannot
escape the charge that they too were instrumental in
the distribution of this patronage. They did so in
Mr Ngcuka’s office as far as the observance
of section 41(6)(a) is concerned... (Hefer
2004: para 79-79)
In addition the Public Protector (Special Report of
the Public Protector on an investigation of a
complaint by Deputy President J Zuma against the
NDPP and the NPA 2004) found amongst other
important constitutional issues, that the statement
made by the National Director on the 23 August
2003 unjustifiably infringed Mr Zuma’s
constitutional rights to human dignity and caused
him to be improperly prejudiced. The statement
was found to be improper and unfair. He found
further that Mr Zuma was not properly informed
about the criminal investigation against him. The
Public Protector recommended that Parliament take
urgent steps to ensure that the National Director
and the NPA are held accountable, in terms of the
law, for these violations.  He also recommended
that Parliament should convene as a matter of
urgency to determine policy guidelines in respect of
the functioning of the DSO that would prevent a
recurrence of these violations. In response to this
the Executive intervened to prevent Parliament from
dealing with this important report. In the end,
Parliament watered down its enquiry to the effect
that no action was taken against either the National
Director or the NPA. Those who criticised this
behaviour and style of work of the DSO were
ridiculed and marginalised.4
Over time, as the DSO continued to conduct its
activities in the same way, the abuse of power, and
the politically motivated nature of this abuse and
patronage, became increasingly clear. So too did
the conflicts between the DSO and the SAPS, as
these two national structures pursued similar goals.
It is in this context that the decision was made to
implement the constitutional imperative to establish
a single national police service within a criminal
justice dispensation that provides for the clear
separation of investigative, prosecutorial and
intelligence powers.  
The ordinary membership of the ANC became
aware of this situation many years ago. Traces of
disquiet, albeit in a generic form, alluding to this
misalignment can already be seen in the resolutions
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of the Stellenbosch National Conference held in
2002. The disquiet grew as the abuse of power
continued without any corrective action on the part
of the Executive. With time this unhappiness
worked its way through the branches of the ANC
and eventually found formal expression in the call
for the disbandment and relocation of the DSO at
the policy conference that predated the ANC’s 52nd
National Conference decision to disband the DSO.  
Much has been said about the ANC’s decision and
the subsequent effort of government to implement
legislative amendments to disband and relocate the
DSO into the SAPS. At the centre of this effort is the
desire of ordinary members of the ANC to address
the abuses that have been associated with the
actions of the NPA and the DSO. This is what
should happen in an evolving democracy such as
ours. It may be argued that this effort is a knee-jerk
reaction to the abuses of power of the DSO, but a
necessary one nonetheless.  
Those opposed to this decision say that it was taken
to protect powerful ANC politicians from current
and future investigations by the DSO. They also
argue that to keep the ANC from exercising
unbridled power, the DSO must be left alone.
Strangely, they remain silent on the exercise of
unbridled power by the DSO in the pursuit of
patronage.  The abuses of the DSO cannot be
explained away as collateral damage in the ‘just’
fight against ‘evil’.    
The DSO was formed as an organ of government to
combat organised crime. To that end the Executive
enacted the founding legislation of the DSO that
combined the power of prosecution, investigation
and information gathering. However, with the value
of hindsight it needs to be acknowledged that the
legislation did not pay proper attention to the
democratic checks and balances required by our
Constitution. 
Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting US court judgement
wrote, in 1928: 
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes
a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means – to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to
secure the convictions of a private criminal-
would bring terrible retribution. Against that
pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely
set its face.  
In the matter of the abuse of power and the use of
state organs as an instrument of patronage, all
democrats must resolutely set their face. The
challenge is to identify and remedy these abuses
when and where they occur.
Those who oppose the disbandment and relocation
of the DSO offer in support of their argument the
interpretation of the judgement handed down by
Judge Kriegler in the Constitutional Court (CC)
matter between the Minister of Defence and
Potsane (Constitutional Court judgment. Minister of
Defence vs. Potsane. CCT 14/2001). In this matter,
the Constitutional Court reversed a High Court
decision and upheld the constitutionality of military
prosecutions as introduced by the Military
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (MDSMA). 
The CC found that a separate and independent
military prosecution system as provided for by the
MDSMA was not prohibited by the existence of a
single, civilian national prosecuting authority as
provided for in section 179 (1) of the Constitution.
The CC reasoned that a single, national prosecuting
authority, in the context of ‘many’ such authorities
that existed in the apartheid era, served to
consolidate into one national prosecuting authority
the various offices of attorneys-general that existed
before. The court in explaining its decision wrote
that ‘single authority’ does not intend to mean
‘exclusive’ or ’only’ but simply serves to denote the
singular ’one’.
Accordingly it is argued that the concurrent
jurisdiction of policing functions by the DSO as a
separate service from the South African Police
Service is not in conflict with Section 199(1) of the
Constitution.  Judge Khampepe, in her
Commission’s report, also argues this position.
Following on from this finding, the Khampepe
Inquiry should have determined whether the DSO,
as a separate service, is subject to all the restraint
provisions of the Constitution that govern the
country’s other security services. 
In a democracy such as ours, it would be difficult
to argue that the powerful DSO should be free of
these restraints.  On this, the Khampepe Report is at
best ambiguous. As regards Judge Khampepe’s
findings of the abuse of power by the DSO, she
should have been more courageous and categorical
in her recommendations. All authority that the
Executive accrues to itself in the exercise of
governance must be restrained and checked.  
The Constitution and the security services 
Judge Johann Kriegler noted that Chapter 11 of the
Constitution, which establishes and governs the
country’s security services, clearly prescribes that
there be ‘a healthy blend of democratic aspiration
and practical safeguards’ against any abuses of the
security services. He argued that this chapter
provides appropriate measures to deal with any
misdirection of any of these services. 
Given the history and the role of the security
services in apartheid South Africa, this was how it
had to be. The particular chapter was written to
provide the constitutional basis for ushering in a
new era for the security services. The drafters of the
constitution sought to construct a democratic
framework for the establishment, structuring,
legislative sanction, accountability, political control,
and parliamentary control of the security services.  
The drafters intended to make all of the security
services subject to national legislation, to the rule of
law, to the authority and oversight of parliament,
and to the command, control and oversight of the
executive. It was intended that the security services
be subject to a strict and enforceable code of
conduct ensuring that their activities are non-
partisan in respect of political parties; to
coordination, judicial scrutiny and monitoring in
respect of interception and monitoring intelligence
activities; and to civilian monitoring of security
services activities by an Inspector General
appointed by parliament. These important
democratic safeguards were not enacted for
nothing. They were enacted in order to prevent the
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incidental to instituting criminal proceedings’, and
for it to do so ’without fear, favour or prejudice’.
The latter is the basis on which the NPA and the
DSO argue that they have a constitutional right to
prosecutorial independence, free from the control
and direction of the Executive. This matter is
amongst the current deliberations of the Ginwala
Commission, appointed by the President to enquiry
into the conduct of the National Director of Public
Prosecutions.
With favour and prejudice
However, the issue that lingers in all of these
commissions is what happens when the DSO or the
NPA perform their functions with favour and
prejudice (partiality) in the exercise of their power.
Under the doctrine of prosecutorial independence
the DSO can claim freedom from executive control
and sanction in all that they do, even when they are
knowingly abusing their powers. Evidence (legal
counsel submissions on behalf of the NDPP) within
the Ginwala Commission confirms the readiness of
the NPA and the DSO to evoke this claim when its
suits them to do so.  At the same time, the failure or
refusal of the NPA and DSO to evoke this claim in
all cases devalues it. 
Prosecutorial independence cannot mean the
freedom to act unlawfully, nor the exercise of
investigative and prosecutorial power in a partisan
manner in the pursuit of political patronage.
Neither can the workings of a democracy be left to
the assurance that the NPA and DSO are staffed
with ‘good’ people that can do no wrong. It is
simply not reasonable to expect that the DSO will
be prosecuted by the NPA, or that the NPA will be
investigated by the DSO for unlawful activities.  It
has not happened and will simply not happen. The
compilation of the Special Browse Report by the
DSO is a case in point.  The NPA did not prosecute
the DSO for its illegal activity. In fact, the NPA
became part of the DSO’s cover-up. 
As a result of the shortcomings of the NPA Act the
DSO has managed, during the decade of its
existence, to resist every attempt to subject its
activities to the requirements of Chapter 11 of the
Constitution. It has done so to its detriment, in a
short-sighted approach to cling on to its unchecked
abuse of power by our security services, and in the
event of such abuse, sanction was to occur.   
Defining the DSO
Central to the problems of the DSO is the difficulty
of defining its nature. What exactly is the DSO? Is
the DSO part of South Africa’s ‘security services’, as
defined by the constitution? Should the DSO be
characterised as a ‘police service’, an ’intelligence
service’ or an ’armed organisation or service’? Is the
DSO the intelligence division of the national
prosecuting authority established by national
legislation?   
Or is the DSO a hybrid of all of the above? And, if
so, is it subject to the ‘healthy blend of democratic
aspirations and practical safeguards’ to which the
Constitutional Court referred? If not, why not? The
Khampepe Commission argues that the DSO is
neither a police service nor an intelligence service
and describes the DSO as a law enforcement
agency. This is a useful description and would
suggest that as such the DSO is part of South
Africa’s security services.   
The NPA Act combines the powerful functions of
prosecutorial, investigative and information
gathering all in one entity. Unfortunately it does so
free from the constitutional checks and balances
that are the bulwarks against the misuse of any of
these combined and powerful activities.  In this
regard the founding legislation of the DSO fails the
stipulations of the Constitution.
Judge Khampepe found that the DSO established an
intelligence gathering capacity beyond the
‘information’ gathering mandate provided for it in
law.  These intelligence gathering activities of the
DSO ought to have been subject to the provisions
contained in Section 210 of the Constitution, which
provides for the oversight of such activities. The
current NPA Act circumvents these constitutional
requirements and allows for the DSO intelligence
gathering activity to be free from any democratic
oversight. 
The Constitution entrusts the NPA with ‘the power
to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the
state and to carry out any necessary functions
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power. The reality is that such shortcomings can be
readily exploited for political purposes by an
Executive willing to do so.  
The NPA Act does not define the mandate of the
DSO as organised crime, as the term is commonly
understood, but as ‘offences or any criminal or
unlawful activities committed in an organised
fashion’. Organised fashion in turn is defined to
‘include the planned, ongoing, continuous or
repeated participation, involvement or engagement
in at least two incidents of criminal or unlawful
conduct that have the same or similar intents,
results, accomplices, victims or methods of
commission, or otherwise are related by
distinguishing characteristics’.
This extremely vague and wide mandate can be
used to bring the full weight of the NPA to bear on
almost any crime. In the absence of any checks and
balances, this wide mandate, in concert with the
even wider powers given by the NPA Act to the
head of the DSO, can be easily abused and,
unfortunately, has been – as findings of the Public
Protector and the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry
have shown. 
Judge Khampepe in her Report argues that this wide
mandate is prudent and that ‘an overly prescriptive
legal mandate would render itself open to constant
jurisdictional and other legal technical attacks and
frustrate the objective for which the DSO was
established’.  With all due respect to the learned
Judge, this is exactly what should happen in a
democracy, especially when the NPA and DSO
wield such enormous unchecked power. It is the
basis for the institution of an independent judiciary. 
Again, Judge Kriegler’s wisdom is insightful: ‘The
NDPP is part of the executive branch of
government, not the judiciary, which is the
recognised protector of the private individual
against the abuse of power… [it is]one of the
purposes of judicial independence under the
doctrine of separation of powers and an important
bulwark against abuse of power by the executive
that independent judges are “well-placed to curb
possible abuse of prosecutorial power”’
(Constitutional Court case CCT 14/01). It is the task
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of the judiciary to scrutinise the exercise of
prosecutorial power and to ensure that it has been
lawfully exercised.  Legislation must never be used
to limit judicial scrutiny and certainly not in the
name of democracy. 
Over the years we have witnessed the leakage of
information from the DSO to influence the public
mindset – smear campaigns, off-the-record
briefings, reports of misuse of funding, abuse of
authority, the unauthorised disclosure of
information, acts of corruption by members of the
NPA, selective investigation and prosecutions,
attempts by the DSO’s senior management to
influence political parties, and skewed plea-bargain
arrangements (Mrwebi 2008).
Some of these violations have been the subject of
the various abovementioned Commissions of
Inquiry into the workings of the DSO. These
commissions have all been scathing in their
criticism of the NPA and DSO, yet nothing has
been done to date to correct this pernicious
doctrine of the abuse of power. Such abuses of
power should not go unprosecuted, left as a
festering sore that infects only the victims of this
abuse. But then, who prosecutes the National
Director of Public Prosecutions and the head of the
DSO for the abuse of power?   
On another front, the DSO has been rather
successful in the media spin game. The impression
has been created that South Africa’s democracy is
under the real threat of rampant corruption and
organised criminality. Indeed, these are serious
crimes that plague our society. We are justified to
feel aggrieved about these crimes. However, as a
society based on the rule of law we must not in our
haste give in to the temptation to suspend the
requirements of the law to which we are all bound
– and none more so than the DSO. 
Much is said in praise of the successes of the DSO,
and indeed it may have a high rate of successful
selective prosecutions. But the question must be
asked whether an independent assessment has been
conducted to measure the DSO’s success against its
overall stated objectives. What has been the true
impact of the DSO’s work on organised crime?
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of its functions. Further, it must be a part of a co-
operative criminal justice system paying due
attention to the jurisdictional authority of other law
enforcement agencies.  It is interesting to note that
in the USA, the FBI is the ‘only’ national law
enforcement agency. The rest of the policing
services are decentralised. And the FBI is a law
enforcement agency, not the national prosecuting
authority. 
The relocation of the DSO into the police should
not be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a step
in a new direction. The final direction will be
informed by a honest debate about the desired
future shape and structure of South Africa’s criminal
justice system. The sooner we have this debate, the
better. 
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Endnotes
1 Moe Shaik was a former Deputy Intelligence 
Coordinator of the National Intelligence Coordinating
Committee but writes in his personal capacity.
2 John Perkin introduces the term ‘Corporatocracy’ to 
describe the alliance of the powerful in his book,
Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. Penguin. 2004.  
3 Judge Khampepe’s Commission of Inquiry Report into 
the mandate and location of the directorate of Special
Operations. Final report February 2006.  Para 21.2,
21.4, Page 64.
Unlike the SAPS, the NPA’s stated policy is to
prosecute only those cases that it believes it has a
reasonable chance of winning in a court of law. In
this context, the success rate of the DSO is
exaggerated. The head of the DSO was recently
forced to concede this point in public.5
We hear much of the high-profile cases involving
ANC political figures, but are told nothing of the
cases the DSO chooses not to investigate. We see
no publicised take-downs of drug barons, bosses of
violent criminal syndicates, CEOs of companies
involved in price fixing, or senior bankers involved
in organised off-shore tax-evasion banking scams.
There is no independent review of those cases that
the NPA loses or botches up, like the reported
Saambou case, and it offers no explanation for
these failures.  Such blatant inconsistencies cannot
go unchecked, protected and explained away
within the doctrine of ‘prosecutorial independence’.
Uniform adherence to policy in all cases will
ensure consistent outcomes.  
Conclusion
Clearly, all is not well within the SAPS and its
public service delivery record leaves much to be
desired. The prevalence of violent crime in our
society can no longer be denied and it affects all of
us. The poor performance of the SAPS must be
located within the broader challenge, which is the
efficacy of the public service as a whole. No effort
must be spared in improving the performance and
efficiency of the police service at all levels. There is
no simple answer to the problems we face in
policing, and the DSO cannot be the substitute for
good policing. There is no doubt that we need to
have the important debate about the future structure
of our criminal justice system, inclusive but not
limited to policing. This debate should pay
particular attention to the kind of society we seek to
build in South Africa and to the real threats that we
face in society.    
Within this debate, a case can be made for the
establishment of a well-resourced law enforcement
agency akin to the USA’s FBI.  However, such an
agency must be established with a clear mandate
subject to the rule of law, the requirements of our
constitution, and to civilian review in the conduct
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‘The DSO in its afore-stated conduct does not
seem to have acted properly and lawfully in
exercising its powers and has failed to
construe those powers in the light and spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’
‘The improper media sensation associated
with the investigation and/or arrest of some
individuals resulting from leaks in the DSO
may open a practice that is inconsistent with
the right to a fair trial guaranteed under
section 35 of the Constitution.’
4 (a) Note the various amendments to the terms of 
reference of the Hefer Commission. The nett effect
of these amendments was that the Hefer
Commission had to first determine whether Mr.
Ngcuka had in fact been an agent of the pre-1994
security services, and, in the event of a positive
finding, whether, because he had been such an
agent, he had misused the prosecuting authority. It
was clear, therefore, that the new terms of reference
were phrased in such a way that in the event of a
negative finding on the first question, the second
more important question dealing with the abuse of
power would fall away. Why these amendments
were made, was never explained. A possible
explanation is offered by Mark Gevisser in his book
Thabo Mbeki, the Dream Deferred, page 401:.’it
humiliated Maharaj and Shaik..’
(b) Following the Public Protector’s report, both 
Ngcuka and Minister Maduna publicly attacked the
integrity of the findings. See Sunday Times, 30 May
2004: Ngcuka hits back at Public Protector.
5 Submission of the head of DSO to parliamentary JSCI as 
reported in the media, February 2008.
